Wednesday, August 12, 2009

Deciding to Discipline: Race, Choice, and Punishment at the Frontlines of Welfare Reform

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Welfare sanctions are financial penalties applied to individuals who fail to comply with
welfare program rules. Their widespread use reflects a turn toward disciplinary approaches
to poverty management. In this article, we investigate how implicit racial biases and
discrediting social markers interact to shape officials’ decisions to impose sanctions. We
present experimental evidence based on hypothetical vignettes that case managers are more
likely to recommend sanctions for Latina and black clients—but not white clients—when
discrediting markers are present. We triangulate these findings with analyses of state
administrative data. Our results for Latinas are mixed, but we find consistent evidence that
the probability of a sanction rises significantly when a discrediting marker (i.e., a prior
sanction for noncompliance) is attached to a black rather than a white welfare client.
Overall, our study clarifies how racial minorities, especially African Americans, are more
likely to be punished for deviant behavior in the new world of disciplinary welfare provision.